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Abstract 
Since the late 1970s, all the developed welfare states of the European Union (EU) have 
been recasting the basic policy mix on which their national systems of social protection 
were built after 1945. Intensified global competition, industrial restructuring, 
budgetary austerity, changing family relations and demographic ageing have thrown 
into question the once sovereign and stable welfare systems of the Golden Age’. 
Moreover, domestic issues of work and welfare have more recently become ever more 
intertwined with processes of European political and economic integration. In this 
respect, it is fair to say that in the EU we have entered an era of semi-sovereign welfare 
states. Together, these forces have produced a momentum of system change that goes 
far beyond the popular notion of welfare state ‘retrenchment’. The ‘new’ welfare edifice 
suggests a departure from a ‘politics against markets’ social-protection perspective, 
towards more of a ‘politics with markets’, social-investment approach. This paper tries 
to capture the comprehensive character of the ongoing effort to recast the architecture of 
the post-war social contract in terms of the concept of welfare recalibration for both 
heuristic and prescriptive purposes. It also addresses the engagement of the EU in 
ongoing processes of recalibrating Europe’s semi-sovereign welfare states. In the policy 
debate the term ‘European social model’ is often invoked. Yet such generalisations gloss 
over the immense differences in welfare state development, design and institutional 
make-up across the EU’s 25 member states and, as a consequence, fail to capture the 
complexity of “contingently convergent” reform trajectories in the recent period. 
Zusammenfassung 
Seit den späten 70er Jahren stellen alle hochentwickelten Sozialstaaten der EU den Mix 
an Sozial-Politiken, wie er nach 1945 in den jeweiligen Staaten geschaffen wurde, auf 
den Prüfstand. Die intensivierte Globalisierung, der Umbau der industriellen Produktion, 
Budgetprobleme, sich verändernde Familienbeziehungen und eine alternde Bevölkerung 
führen zu immer mehr Zweifeln an dem lange Zeit bewährten und stabilen 
wohlfahrtsstaatlichen System des goldenen Zeitalters. Dazu kommt, dass in letzter Zeit 
bisher nationale Themen wie Arbeit und Wohlfahrtsstaat immer stärker in die Prozesse 
der europäischen Integration hineingezogen werden. In diesem Blickwinkel gesehen ist 
es angemessen zu sagen, dass in der EU die Ära der nur noch halbsouveränen Staaten 
begonnen hat. All dies zusammengenommen kann man sagen, dass sich eine 
Konstellation ergeben hat, in der sich ein Systemwechsel vollzieht, der weit über die 
populäre Wahrnehmung der Öffentlichkeit vom „Abbau des Sozialstaats“ hinausgeht. 
Die Konstruktion der neuen Wohlfahrtspolitik bedeutet den Abschied von einer Politik 
des sozialen Beschützens „gegen die Märkte“ hin zu einer Politik sozialer Investitionen 
„mit den Märkten“. In diesem Papier wird versucht, die umfassende Bedeutung der 
fortdauernden Bemühungen zur Umgestaltung der Architektur des Sozialkontrakts aus 
der Nachkriegszeit zu erfassen - und zwar sowohl für  heuristische Zwecke wie auch als 
Handlungsanleitung. Die Analyse bezieht sich auch auf das Engagement der EU in den 
andauernden Prozessen, die halbsouveränen Wohlfahrtsstaaten Europas neu zu 
„justieren“. In politischen Diskussionen wird oft der Begriff vom „Europäischen 
Sozialmodell“ beschworen. 
Aber solche Generalisierungen gehen über die wirklich großen Unterschiede in den 
wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Entwicklungen, in der Gestaltung und im institutionellem Aufbau 
der 25 EU-Mitgliedstaaten hinweg und verfehlen so als Konsequenz, die Komplexität 
der „kontingenten Konvergenz“ der Reformwege in den vergangenen Jahren richtig zu 
erfassen. 
Content 
1 The adaptive capacity of the semi-sovereign welfare state ....... 1 
2 Caveats and challenges to the ‘European Social Model’ .......... 2 
3 A series of profound reforms ....................................................... 4 
4 Understanding welfare recalibration .......................................... 8 
5 Beyond the ‘double bind’ of social Europe............................... 14 
6 The imperative social pragmatism ............................................ 18 
References ...................................................................................... 21 
Recalibrating Europe’s Semi-Sovereign Welfare States 
1 The adaptive capacity of the semi-sovereign welfare state  
The striking intensity and the comprehensive character of welfare reform across the 
majority of the Member States of the European Union (EU) since the 1990s are very 
much at odds with the prevalent image of a ‘frozen welfare landscape’ presented in the 
academic literature. Most importantly, the substantive extent of welfare reform across a 
large number of EU Member States adds up to a momentum of system change that goes 
far beyond the popular concepts of ‘retrenchment’, ‘roll-back’, ‘retreat’ and ’demise’. 
But to say that European welfare states are far from sclerotic is not to say that they are 
in good shape. With 20 million citizens out of work and 90 million people otherwise 
inactive, there certainly is no room for complacency.  
Welfare reform is, of course, not a smooth process. Corrective measures are 
difficult, but in the face of protracted policy failures they are enacted and implemented 
through the competitive political process. While reform experiences over the past two 
decades have primarily been built on processes of domestic (crisis-induced) lesson-
drawing, more recently, cross-national social learning has been taken up in the context 
of the EU. In short, welfare reform is a highly reflexive and knowledge-intensive 
political process. From this perspective, it follows that the welfare state is best 
understood as an ‘evolutionary’ system, whose goals, aims, functions and institutions 
change over time, however slowly and imperfectly.  
Today, an increasing number of academic observers are advocating a new welfare 
repertoire based on consistent normative principles, coherent causal understanding, 
(re-)distributive concerns and institutional practices – a repertoire that is comparable in 
its generalities to that of the male-breadwinner Keynesian welfare state of the post-war 
decades. These observers concur in their diagnosis that the current imperative of 
recasting the welfare state is very much rooted in the incongruence between new ‘post-
industrial’ social risks and diverse family and labour market needs, on the one hand, and 
the institutional resilience of male-breadwinner social policy provisions, on the other. In 
terms of policy solutions, these authors prioritise high levels of employment for both 
men and women as the key policy objective, accompanied by elements of flexibility and 
security that facilitate men and especially women in accommodating both work and 
family life, that are managed by new forms of governance and are based on subtle 
combinations of public, private and individual efforts and resources (Esping-Andersen 
et al., 2002; Esping-Andersen, 2005; Jenson/Saint-Martin, 2003; Taylor-Gooby, 2004). 
By adopting a life-course perspective, the advocates of the ‘new’ welfare architecture of 
the 21st century seek to identify the inter-connectedness of social risks and needs over 
the life course, on the basis of which they are able to draft a ‘social investment’ policy 
agenda. The Keynesian emphasis on ‘effective demand’ management is hereby shifted 
towards an emphasis on ‘effective supply’, with the implication of removing social 
barriers to labour market entry, discouraging early exit, making labour market 
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transitions less precarious, and providing gender equality and equality of opportunity 
throughout the life cycle in response to the drastic changes in the worlds of work and 
welfare (Esping-Andersen et al., 2002; Ferrera/Hemerijck/Rhodes, 2000; Giddens, 
1999, 2001; Kenworthy, 2004; NESC, 2005; OECD, 1999). 
My argument is built up as follows. First, Section 2 qualifies the underspecified use 
of the concept known as the ‘European social model’ in the face of the three-pronged 
challenge of economic internationalisation, post-industrial differentiation and 
permanent austerity. Next, Section 3 provides an inventory of a number of substantive 
changes in the make-up of Europe’s mature welfare states over the final quarter of the 
20th century. Section 4 presents the current effort to recast the architecture of the post-
war social contract in terms of the concept of welfare recalibration for heuristic and 
prescriptive purposes. Next, Section 5 highlights the constraints and opportunities for 
EU engagement in ongoing processes of recalibrating Europe’s welfare states. Since the 
mid-1980s, domestic issues of work and welfare have become increasingly intertwined 
with processes of European political and economic integration. In this respect, it is fair 
to say that in the EU we have entered an era of semi-sovereign welfare states 
(Leibfried/Pierson, 2000). In conclusion, Section 6 addresses the political imperative for 
a ‘social-investment-centred’ welfare agenda in the early 21st century. It is my 
contention that with a little more policy creativity, we should be able to turn the current 
tide of inward-looking pessimism regarding the sustainability of the ‘European social 
model’ into a renewed political effort represented by forward- and outward-looking 
‘social pragmatism’.  
2 Caveats and challenges to the ‘European Social Model’  
In the heated debate over the future of the EU, the concept of a distinctly European 
social model is increasingly being used in policy discussions and political debate. 
Although European welfare states share a number of features that set them apart from 
other geopolitical regions like North America and Southeast Asia, it is important at the 
outset to make a number of qualifying reservations with regard to the underspecified use 
of the notion of ‘European social model’. My most important caveat is that the notion of 
a European social ‘model’ is inherently static. While the architects of the post-war 
welfare state, John Maynard Keynes and William Beveridge, could assume that the 
future would be made up of stable male-breadwinner families and expanding industrial 
labour markets, this picture of economy and society no longer holds. Since the late 
1970s, consecutive changes in the world economy, labour markets and family structures 
have disturbed the once sovereign and stable welfare ‘equilibria’ of employment-
friendly macroeconomic policy, collective wage bargaining, progressive taxation, broad 
social security coverage and protective labour market regulation. As a consequence, all 
the developed welfare states of the EU have been recasting the basic policy mix upon 
which their national systems of social protection were built after 1945 
(Hemerijck/Schludi, 2000). Moreover, couching policy discussions in terms of 
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competing ‘models’ easily triggers ideological strife — a battle between warring 
alternatives represented by antagonistic advocacy coalitions. A casual glance at the 
recent French referendum campaign over the Constitutional Treaty clearly reveals the 
clash between two polarised positions. The French version of the European social model 
was pitted against a false stereotype of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model of capitalism, 
allegedly a ‘free market without a safety net’. In addition, the notion of a distinctly 
European social model suggests a large degree of uniformity transcending national 
boundaries, which surely cannot be sustained empirically in an EU of 25 Member 
States. There are immense differences in development, policy design, eligibility criteria, 
modes of financing and institutional make-up across Europe (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 
1999; Ferrera/Hemerijck/Rhodes, 2000). Finally, the notion of a distinctly European 
social model suggests a lot of virtu on the part of rational policy-makers, which also 
gives the impression that best practices can easily be transported from one Member 
State to another. Many social reform initiatives taken in recent years in the areas in 
question were expedient responses to impending economic crisis and political 
conditions. Also, the incubation periods of reforms before they start to pay off in terms 
of growth and jobs are extremely lengthy. Usually, it is incoming governments that reap 
the benefits of painful reforms enacted by their predecessors. In short: there are no 
models of eternal bliss to copy.  
Despite the significant progress already made in different countries, there are still 
three sets of challenges urging contemporary policy-makers to persist in their efforts to 
reform the welfare state, redesign institutions and elaborate new principles of social 
justice. First, from without, international competition is challenging the redistributive 
scope and decommodifying power of the national welfare state. Many academic 
observers believe that the increase in cross-border competition in the markets for 
money, goods and services has substantially reduced the room for manoeuvre of 
national welfare states (Scharpf, 2000). Economic internationalisation demands 
countercyclical macroeconomic management, while increased openness exposes 
generous welfare states to trade competition and permits capital to move to the lowest-
cost producer countries. Finally, there is the danger that tax competition will result in an 
underprovision of public goods. Second, from within, ageing populations, declining 
birth rates, changing gender roles in households as a result of the mass entry of women 
to the labour market, the shift from an industrial to the service economy, and new 
technologies in the organisation of work, are engendering suboptimal employment 
levels, new inequalities and skill-biased patterns of social exclusion. According to Gøsta 
Esping-Andersen (Esping-Andersen et al., 2002), the main reason why the existing 
systems of social care have become overstretched stems from the weakening of labour 
markets and family households as traditional providers of welfare. In addition, new 
sources of immigration and segregation, also in the housing market in metropolitan 
areas, pose a challenge to social cohesion. And, finally, while policy-makers must find 
new ways to manage the adverse consequences of economic internationalisation and 
post-industrial differentiation, their endeavours to recast the welfare state are severely 
constrained by long-standing social policy commitments in the areas of unemployment 
and pensions, which have ushered in a period of permanent austerity (Pierson, 2001). 
The maturation of welfare commitments — policies put in place to cater for the social 
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risks associated with the post-war industrial era — now seem to be crowding out and 
overloading the available policy space for effective policy responses, especially in 
public services under conditions of low economic growth. This spectre of permanent 
austerity is likely to intensify in the face of population ageing. As an intervening 
variable in the process, European (economic) integration is fundamentally recasting the 
boundaries of national systems of social protection — constraining the autonomy of 
domestic policy options but also opening up opportunities for EU-led multilevel open 
policy coordination (Ferrera, 2005; Zeitlin/Pochet, 2005).  
3 A series of profound reforms  
The welfare state, in the shape and form in which it developed in Western Europe in the 
second half of the 20th century, represents a unique historical achievement. Never before 
in history, as Fritz Scharpf puts it, ‘has democratic politics been so effectively used to 
promote civil liberty, economic growth, social solidarity and public well-being’ 
(Scharpf, 2003). Towards the late 1970s, the celebration of the welfare state gave way 
to doubts. The oil crises of the 1970s, together with the changing character of 
international competition, deindustrialisation and the eroding effectiveness of domestic 
Keynesian demand management, led to a massive surge in unemployment not seen 
since the 1930s. In the 1980s, the ‘prospects for survival’ of the welfare state were 
recognised as poor. Economists singled out the accumulation of perverse labour-market 
rigidities produced by the welfare state as the obstacle that was impeding flexible 
adjustment, blocking technological innovation and hampering employment and 
economic growth in an integrating world economy (OECD, 1994). But despite the 
obvious ‘irresistible forces’ urging for reform, the European welfare state proved to be, 
as one leading scholar put it, an ‘unmovable object’ (Pierson, 1998).  
A finer-grained comparative analysis of long-term developments, however, shows 
that the empirical foundations of welfare state inertia are fairly shaky. On the contrary, 
over the final quarter of the 20th century, developed EU welfare states have been 
recasting the basic social contract upon which their national welfare states were built 
after 1945. If we interpret the welfare state more broadly than only social protection as 
it is narrowly understood, it is possible to paint an extensive, cumulatively 
transformative process of policy change across a number of intimately related policy 
areas.  
In macroeconomic policy, up to the late 1970s Keynesian macroeconomic policy 
priorities geared towards full employment as a principal goal of economic management 
prevailed. In the face of stagflation — i.e., the combination of high inflation and rising 
unemployment — the Keynesian order gave way to a stricter macroeconomic policy 
framework centred on economic stability, hard currencies, low inflation, sound budgets 
and debt reduction. Persistently high public deficits and inflation rates are undesirable in 
themselves and incompatible with global financial markets. The current framework of 
4 
Recalibrating Europe’s Semi-Sovereign Welfare States 
European Monetary Union (EMU) and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), however, 
does not provide for an adequate macroeconomic regime. The key problem today is that 
EMU and the SGP do not do justice to the differences in economic circumstances across 
the Member States. The European Central Bank (ECB) sets interest rates in accordance 
with European-wide averages and the development of the trade cycle rather than with 
nation-specific shocks. Although fiscal discipline is in the self-interest of Member 
States, once a recession hits it is already too late to tinker with employment regulation 
and social protection. Moreover, inconsiderate and bold reforms of labour market 
regulation and social protection during a downturn stifle the market and are likely to 
generate economic stagnation and social unrest. Macroeconomic stability is a must, but 
a little more flexibility is called for.  
In the 1980s, the responsibility for employment shifted away from macroeconomic 
policy towards adjacent areas of social and economic regulation. In the field of wage 
policy, a reorientation took place from the 1980s onwards in favour of market-based 
wage restraint in the face of intensified economic internationalisation. Since the early 
1980s, wage restraint has resumed importance as a requirement for successful 
adjustment by facilitating competitiveness, profitability and — as a second-order effect 
— employment. Strategies of wage moderation have been pursued in many European 
countries through a new generation of social pacts linked with wider packages of 
negotiated reform, including labour market regulation and social protection. The 
rediscovery of a jobs-intensive growth path by way of social pacts in the Netherlands, 
Ireland and Denmark has also allowed sectoral bargainers to strike decentralised deals 
on productivity, training and job opportunities for less productive workers. In the 1990s, 
the EMU entrance examination played a critical role in the resurgence of national social 
pacts for hard-currency latecomers like Italy, Portugal and Greece, stimulating policy-
makers and the social partners to rekindle cooperative, positive-sum solutions to the 
predicament of economic adjustment, for example by making taxation and social 
protection more ‘employment friendly’ (Fajertag/Pochet, 2000).  
In the area of labour market policy, in the 1990s the new objective became 
maximising employment rather than inducing labour market exit, and this implied new 
links between employment policy and social security. The greater the number of people 
participating full time and part time in the labour market, the greater the contribution 
they make towards maintaining the affordability of adequate levels of social protection. 
This is also the key message of the Jobs, Jobs, Jobs Report of the Employment 
Taskforce, established by the European Commission and chaired by the former Dutch 
prime minister Wim Kok (Kok et al., 2003). In the process, public employment services 
(PES) in many countries have lost their placement monopoly. And although private 
placement agencies have still not gained a substantial share of the market, they have at 
least compelled the PES to modernise their service delivery. With respect to labour 
market regulation, understood in the more narrow sense, empirical evidence from 
Denmark and the Netherlands suggests that the acceptance of flexible labour markets is 
enhanced if it is matched by strong social guarantees. While systems combining 
restrictive dismissal protection with meagre unemployment benefits essentially cater to 
the interests of insiders, ‘flexicure’ systems based on minimal job protection but 
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offering decent standards of social protection for the unemployed are best able to bridge 
the gap between insiders and outsiders.  
Within the sphere of social security, the changes in macroeconomic management 
and wage policy have resulted in a shift from passive policy priorities aimed at income 
maintenance towards a greater emphasis on the activation and reintegration of 
vulnerable groups. In the process, the function of social security has changed from the 
passive compensation of social risks to a corrective attempt to change the behavioural 
incentives of claimants and employers, together with an emphasis on preventative social 
investments. This is also evidenced by the shift from out-of-work benefits to in-work 
benefits. Different strategies are appropriate to different welfare states. In the United 
Kingdom, where income guarantees and unemployment benefits are modest, individual 
tax credits to support low-wage workers and their families are very popular. In 
continental Europe, the main problem is that hefty social contributions price less 
productive workers out of the market. In the face of the relative weakening of traditional 
male-breadwinner social insurance programmes, policy-makers in these countries have 
turned towards strengthening the minimum income protection functions of the welfare 
state, coupling this approach with strong activation and reintegration measures. Many 
European welfare states seem to be evolving towards a dual social protection model, 
combining both Bismarckian social insurance and Beveridgian minimum income 
protection tiers. In this respect, the French and Belgian welfare states have increased 
social assistance protection for the neediest, using targeted benefits instead of universal 
benefits financed through taxation and general revenues. In 2005, through the so-called 
Hartz IV reforms, Germany followed suit while at the same time stepping up job-search 
requirements for the non-employed. 
In the area of old-age pensions, the most important trend is the growth of 
(compulsory) occupational and private pensions. Most welfare states are engaged in 
developing multipillar systems, combining pay-as-you-go and fully funded methods 
with a tight (actuarial) link between pension benefits and contributions. Fiscal 
incentives have been introduced to encourage people to take out private pension 
insurance. In the 1990s, a number of countries, notably the Netherlands, France, 
Portugal, Ireland and Belgium, started to build up reserve funds in order to maintain 
adequate pension provision when the baby-boom generation retires. Changes in 
indexation rules have also helped to reduce pension liabilities. In Spain restrictions have 
gone hand in hand with an attempt to upgrade minimum pension benefits. Measures to 
combine work and retirement involving tax allowances and partial pension benefits 
have been introduced in Denmark and Belgium. Finland has developed policy 
approaches for improving the occupational health, working capacity and well-being of 
ageing workers in order to keep older workers in the workforce for as long as possible 
(Clark/Whiteside, 2003).  
Social services have experienced something of a comeback lately. Spending on 
childcare, education, health and care for the elderly, as well as training and employment 
services, has increased practically everywhere in Western Europe over the past decade 
(Taylor-Gooby, 2004). Ageing and longevity, especially, generate a need for care that 
working families cannot or are no longer willing to provide. In Scandinavia the 
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expansion of services to families began in the 1970s in tandem with the rise in female 
labour supply. It was in large part this policy of ‘de-familialisation’ of caring 
responsibilities that catalysed the dual-earner norm. In most other European countries, 
female employment growth came much later (Daly, 2000). In southern Europe it is only 
during the past decade that we have seen a sharp rise. Throughout the EU, leave 
arrangements have also been expanded — in terms of both the time and the scope of 
coverage — to include care for the frail elderly and sick children. Social service 
delivery organisations have also been given more autonomy in deciding how to use 
resources in the pursuit of agreed outcomes and more incentives to innovate in the 
search for improvements, while also structuring their accountability to service users and 
central government in new ways.  
In terms of the financial architecture of the welfare state, finally, we can observe an 
increase in user financing in the areas of childcare, care for the elderly and medical care. 
At the same time, fiscal incentives have been introduced to encourage people to take out 
private services and insurance, especially in the areas of health and pensions. 
Management audit systems have been introduced to control and monitor the volume of 
public expenditure; this has taken the form of limited annual budgets and delegation of 
financial responsibility and autonomy to schools and hospital in countries like Sweden, 
Germany and the Netherlands. With respect to taxation, as a result of intensified 
competition across the EU, many Member States have started to pursue a combination 
strategy of lower statutory tax rates and a broadening of the tax base. This implies a 
shift away from the focus on vertical redistribution between rich and poor citizens, but, 
as consequence of base broadening, not per se at the expense of prevailing welfare 
commitments.  
Over the past two decades, as the above inventory of reform shows, many 
European welfare states have — with varying degrees of success, but in some cases also 
failure — taken measures in order to change the direction of economic restructuring by 
pushing through adjustments in macroeconomic policy, industrial relations, taxation, 
social security, labour market policy, employment protection legislation, pensions and 
social services, and welfare financing. Many reforms have been unpopular, but several 
have been implemented with the consent of opposition parties, trade unions and 
employer organisations. In the process, we have seen the rise and fall, respectively, of 
the 1970s Swedish model of macroeconomic management, the 1980s German 
‘Rhineland’ model of diversified quality production and the 1990s Dutch employment 
miracle. While today the Celtic Tiger, the Danish Lego model, the Finnish knowledge 
economy and revamped New Britain under Tony Blair figure as model countries to 
emulate, nothing can guarantee that their welfare systems will prove effective in 
responding to the next phase of social and economic turmoil. The welfare reform 
momentum of the 1980s and 1990s was triggered largely by intensified international 
competition within the context of the internal market in the enlarged EU. Thus far the 
endogenous dynamics of the transformation of work, gender, family and demography 
have remained secondary in the reform agenda, in part due to opposition from the 
remaining vestiges of male-breadwinner welfare provision. There is a real need to take 
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policy issues related to post-industrial social change on board in the next wave of 
reform. 
4 Understanding welfare recalibration 
Welfare reform crucially builds on processes of domestic lesson-drawing, but 
increasingly, especially in the context of the EU, on cross-national social learning. As 
such, social policy reform processes cannot simply be reduced to political explanations 
of changes in the balance of power and interests. None of the policy actors participating 
in lengthy processes of welfare reform over the past two decades could rely on well-
informed conceptions of what kind of social policy paradigm would ultimately result 
from their efforts of experiential domestic and cross-national exploratory policy 
learning. Active reformers were equally unable to judge with much precision how the 
sequence of policy shifts across a large number of interdependent policy areas would 
affect their own political and economic interests over time. 
In an attempt to capture this more encompassing endeavour to rewrite the post-war 
social contract, especially since the 1990s, Maurizio Ferrera, Martin Rhodes and I have 
in recent years turned to the multidimensional concept of welfare recalibration for both 
heuristic and prescriptive purposes (Ferrera/Hemerijck, 2003; 
Ferrera/Hemerijck/Rhodes, 2000).1 The notion of welfare recalibration is meant to 
suggest an extensive form of remodelling by way of providing a new cast for the 
welfare state as we know it along four key dimensions: functional, distributive, 
normative and institutional recalibration. The guiding question of welfare recalibration 
is: What sort ‘new welfare architecture’ is compatible with international 
competitiveness, the transformation of working life, the demise of traditional family 
structures, demographic ageing and fiscal austerity? Hereby welfare recalibration is a 
highly reflexive and knowledge-intensive, interconnected and multipurpose reform 
process. Reform decisions pass through and are based upon cognitive, normative, 
distributive and institutional judgements as to how to improve policy performance under 
conditions of structural and environmental change. Each of the four dimensions of 
welfare recalibration requires elaboration. 
Functional recalibration has to do with the social risks against which the welfare 
state aspires to protect. The need for functional recalibration is often described in terms 
of the shift from ‘old’ to ‘new’ social risks facing people as a result of the transition 
from a male-breadwinner industrial to a dual-earner post-industrial society. Skill-biased 
technological change, the feminisation of the labour market and demographic ageing (as 
a result of rising life expectancy and rapidly falling birth rates) are the most important 
drivers of the new post-industrial risk profile. While the boundaries between being ‘in’ 
and ‘out’ of work have been blurred by increases in atypical work, low wages, 
                                                     
1  The term ‘recalibration’ was suggested to us by Jonathan Zeitlin. 
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subsidised jobs and training programs, one job is no longer enough to keep low-income 
families out of poverty. In the face of demographic ageing and in the light of a declining 
workforce, nobody can be left inactive for long. European welfare states are all in the 
process of moving away from the breadwinner/caregiver model, under which mothers 
are expected to stay at home with their children, to a model of ‘employment for all’, 
under which mothers are expected to enter the labour force. This transition, which Ann 
Orloff discusses in terms of the ‘farewell to maternalism’, is not merely the product of 
changing gender values (normative recalibration), it is also part of a more deliberate 
strategy of policy-makers in the face of population ageing to attract mothers into the 
workforce through activation programs, tax subsidies, part-time employment regulation, 
and the expansion of family services (Orloff, 2005). As new social risks concern both 
the labour market and family life, they extend the demand for functional recalibration 
from unemployment, sickness, disability and old-age insurance to family-friendly 
services to encourage labour market opportunities for women and raise birth rates.  
The challenge is to reconcile women’s new career preferences with the continued 
desire to form families. Failure to do so will produce either fertility rates below the 
renewal level or suboptimal levels of employment and income. Female employment is 
the key to resolving child poverty, which is on the rise in most European countries. 
Child poverty rates decline by a factor of three or four when mothers work. Labour 
market participation rates in southern Europe, especially for the younger female cohorts, 
are rapidly catching up to northern European averages. Among older women (aged 
55−64), the employment gap is still considerable, at levels of only 16% in Italy and 23% 
in the Netherlands, compared to 65% in Sweden. Exit from the labour force at age 50, 
as Esping-Andersen forcefully argues, implies major foregone lifetime income and 
probably inferior pension entitlements for women, and for the public economy foregone 
government (tax) revenue. The standard family-friendly policy package includes a 
neutral, individual taxation regime, maternity-cum-parental leave with job security, and 
subsidised childcare (Esping-Andersen, 2005). 
Since life chances are so strongly determined by what happens in childhood, a 
comprehensive child investment strategy with a strong emphasis on early childhood 
development is imperative. Access to affordable, quality childcare is sine qua non for 
any workable future equilibrium. Esping-Andersen maintains that childcare demand 
cannot be adequately met via commercial care markets. In a purely commercial regime, 
low-income parents will probably not be able to afford quality care. They may respond 
by placing children in cheap, low-quality care or by withdrawing from the labour 
market altogether. Inaccessible childcare will provoke low fertility; moreover, low-
quality care is harmful to children and low female employment increases child poverty 
(Esping-Andersen, 2005). It should be emphasised that highlighting early childhood 
development goes beyond the idea that childcare is necessary to allow mothers and 
fathers to reconcile work and family life. A ‘child-centred social investment strategy’ is 
needed to ensure that children will be lifelong learners and strong contributors to their 
societies. More children, educated to perform in a knowledge economy, are needed to 
keep the economy going for a retiring baby-boom generation with high care needs.  
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If Europe wishes to be competitive in the new, knowledge-based society, there is 
an urgent need to invest in human capital throughout the life course. The activity rate of 
those with higher education exceeds 80% practically everywhere in Europe, whereas the 
corresponding figure in the case of people with only primary education is less than 40%. 
Considering the looming demographic imbalances we face, we surely cannot afford 
large skill deficits. High school-dropout rates provide a good indicator of the welfare 
deficit we face (above 30% in Spain, almost 25% in the Netherlands and less than 15% 
in Denmark and Sweden). While inequalities are widening in the knowledge economy, 
this also implies that parents’ ability to invest in their children’s fortunes is becoming 
more unequal. Everyone’s favourite solution is, of course, education. The revitalisation 
of both the Irish and the Finnish economies is in part based on increased investments in 
education, preventing early departure from formal education and training, and 
facilitating the transition from school to work, in particular that of school-leavers with 
low qualifications. Social and employment policies aimed at developing the quality of 
human resources for the knowledge economy assume the role of social investments. 
Distributive recalibration concerns the rebalancing of social protection provisions 
across policy clienteles, stakeholder interests, and public and private resources. Many of 
the so-called ‘new social risks’, like family formation, divorce, the elderly becoming 
dependent on care, declining fertility and accelerating population ageing are primarily 
borne by young people and young families, signifying a shift in social risks from the 
elderly to the young. However, the new risk-bearers lack critical social and political 
influence. Their ability to exert electoral and extra-parliamentary pressure is limited by 
the fact that, for most people, exposure to new social risks is a transitory phase of the 
family life course, concerned with child-rearing, care for the elderly, or labour market 
entry and exit (Taylor-Gooby, 2004).  
The interaction between economic performance and the welfare state is largely 
mediated through the labour market. The majority of Europe’s mature welfare states are 
confronted with a syndrome of labour market segmentation between ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’. As family and gender issues remained secondary in the reform momentum 
of the 1980s and 1990s, post-industrial social and economic change seems to perversely 
reinforce an over-accumulation of insurance benefits on the side of ‘guaranteed’ 
breadwinner workers with quasi-tenured jobs, alongside inadequate protection for those 
employed in the weaker sectors of the labour market, particularly young people, 
women, immigrants and older low-skilled workers. Most likely, labour markets will 
become ever more flexible. While the boundaries between being ‘in’ and ‘out’ of work 
have been blurred by increases in atypical work, low-wages, subsidised jobs and 
training programs, one job is no longer enough to keep low-income families out of 
poverty. Post-industrial job growth is highly biased in favour of high-skilled jobs. 
However, increased labour market flexibility, together with the continuing rise in 
female employment will, in addition, also encourage the growth of a sizeable amount of 
low-skilled and semi-skilled jobs in the social sector and in personal services. The 
policy challenge is how to mitigate the emergence of new forms of labour market 
segmentation through what could be called ‘preventive employability’, combining 
increases in the flexibility of labour relations by way of relaxing dismissal protection 
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while generating a higher level of security for employees in flexible jobs. Flexible 
working conditions are often part and parcel of family-friendly employment policy 
provisions. There is a clear relation between the ratio of part-time jobs and female 
employment growth. But the ability of part-time employment to harmonise careers with 
family depends very much on employment regulation, that is, whether part-time work is 
recognised as a regular job with basic social insurance participation, and on whether it 
offers possibilities for career mobility. 
Special attention should also be given to the labour market problems of migrants 
and non-EU nationals, whose rate of unemployment averages twice that of EU 
nationals. Skills, cultural and language barriers, and discrimination together call for a 
real improvement in integration policies, including access to social citizenship. In our 
ethnically and culturally diversified societies, the welfare state faces the major 
challenge of ensuring that immigrants and their children do not fall behind. The recent 
outbreak of violence in the banlieus of the metropolitan cities of France reveals how 
economic exclusion and physical concentration reinforce educational 
underperformance, excessive segregation and self-destructive spirals of marginalisation. 
The overriding policy lesson is that in the face of demographic ageing and in the light of 
a declining workforce, nobody can be left inactive (for long)! 
The combination of late entry into the labour market by young people, early exit by 
older workers and higher life expectancy translates into a looming financing deficit for 
the welfare state. Most European pension regimes are both inequitable and ineffective, 
and are also replete with early exit measures defended by labour market insiders. 
Ageing is a challenge but also a blessing, since people live longer in good health. Two 
trends justify adjustment of retirement regimes: a) the health status of each elderly 
cohort is better than that of the last; at present a man aged 65 can look forward to 
another ten healthy years; and b) the skill gap between the elderly and the young is 
rapidly narrowing. Older people in the future will be much better educationally prepared 
than now to adapt to the knowledge economy with the aid of retraining and lifelong 
learning. Beyond the development of multipillar systems, including both PAYGO (pay-
as-you-go) and funded schemes, in the area of pension policy, the challenge lies in how 
to allocate the additional expenditure that inevitably accompanies population ageing 
(Myles, 2002). Of crucial importance in terms of equity remain first-tier pension 
guarantees financed from general revenue and indexed to prices for when the next 
generation of flexible labour market cohorts start to retire. The provision of sustainable 
pensions requires that we raise the employment rates of older workers and increase 
retirement age to 67. Later retirement is both effective and equitable. It is efficient 
because it creates both more revenue intake and less spending at the same time. It is 
intergenerationally equitable because both retirees and workers contribute in equal 
proportions. Flexible retirement and the introduction of incentives to postpone 
retirement could also greatly alleviate the pension burden. Although there has been a 
slight increase of part-time work among the elderly and it has been shown that part-time 
work and participation rates among older people are positively related, there is still little 
systematic and comprehensive policy activity to enhance the variable opportunity set for 
older workers. If older workers remain employed for ten years longer than is now the 
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norm in early-exit welfare regimes, household incomes will increase substantially, 
which implies less poverty, less spending on social assistance and greater government 
revenue. 
Normative recalibration concerns the norms and values implicated in the dilemmas 
emerging from the search for functionally effective and distributively fair policy 
proposals. Protecting the vulnerable and preventing the disadvantaged from becoming 
vulnerable lay at the heart of the normative underpinning of the post-war welfare state. 
Politically, the more reform proposals alter the distributive balance between groups and 
vested interests, the more important it is, of course, to put forward and elaborate new 
normative frameworks and discourses capable of advocating the reform agenda as a 
‘win-win’ project, i.e. of justifying reform in terms of underlying ‘moral foundations’ 
(Vandenbroucke, 2002). The normative philosophy behind recent labour market reforms 
is one of reciprocal obligations. Welfare recipients must be obliged to accept 
employment or training in order to receive benefits, while the state has the obligation to 
enhance the employability of benefit claimants. Raising female participation in the 
labour market is also an issue of gender equality and social justice. 
A number of policy analysts today advocate ‘dynamising’ Rawls’ theory of social 
justice (Esping-Andersen et al., 2002; Ferrera/Hemerijck/Rhodes, 2000). They suggest a 
tentative shift in emphasis in the normative debate away from a static notion of 
distributive justice, focused on here-and-now redistribution, and towards a dynamic 
social-liberal notion of restoring equality of opportunity across the life course. This 
implies a reorientation in social citizenship, away from freedom from want towards 
freedom to act, while continuing to guarantee a rich social minimum. Redistribution, for 
example through progressive taxation, remains important. These authors also advocate 
modern social policy as a societal investment, mobilising the developmental capabilities 
of citizens to achieve self-reliance under post-industrial conditions, rather than as 
income-replacing compensation for industrial market failures. Esping-Andersen seeks 
inspiration in John Rawls’ ‘difference principle’, which stipulates that substantial 
changes in the social status of citizens must be to the greatest advantage of the worst off 
(Rawls, 1971). Rawlsian ideas of social justice are primarily pertinent with respect to 
market inequalities. John Myles has argued that the elaboration of a new normative 
framework of distributive fairness, touching on norms of intergenerational equity and 
intragenerational justice, is particularly urgent in the field of old-age policy. 
Intergenerational equity, he maintains, implies that the transition costs associated with 
population ageing be proportionately shared by both young and old. In agreement with 
Rawls’ difference principle, pension reform should thus be to the advantage (or to the 
least possible disadvantage) of the worst off within both the working and the retired 
population (Myles, 2002). Ronald Dworkin has forcefully argued that considerations of 
distributive fairness should take account both of the social circumstances that produce 
inequalities in living conditions and of the family and individual choices that affect life 
chances (Dworkin, 2000). To the extent to which the emergent new social risk profiles 
cut across the boundaries between the public and private spheres, they raise pressing 
normative questions about individual, family, social and public responsibilities 
(Schmidt, 2005). The normative position of Amartya Sen is rooted in his concept of 
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capabilities (Sen, 1985; 2001). For Sen, material equality is at best a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for a fair distribution of life chances. What is decisive is the ability 
of citizens to convert the resources available to them into living conditions they 
themselves aspire to. Sen’s normative view corresponds with a more flexible 
endowment of resources, which may be unevenly distributed but nevertheless enable 
individual citizens to realise their own life plans. From the perspective of social 
capabilities, active participation in employment is of crucial importance because 
participation in social life through employment relations is vital for gaining respect 
from others as well as self-respect in post-industrial societies (Salais, 2003). Following 
the logic of Sen’s capability approach, Günther Schmid advocates labour market policy 
interventions to empower citizens to act as autonomous agents and, especially, to allow 
for choice between different employment statuses according to shifting preferences and 
circumstances during the life course (Schmid, 2005; Schmid/Gazier, 2002). Having the 
opportunity to change these plans and to make transitions between various kinds of 
employment, for instance between part-time and full-time work, or dependent work and 
self-employment or a combination of both, without repeated disruptions, is important in 
the face of economic internationalisation and post-industrial differentiation. The 
normative focus of social policy hereby shifts from ex post redistribution towards 
preventive or ex ante employability. Wolfgang Streeck views the new ‘asset-based’ 
discourse of social justice in terms of ‘supply-side egalitarianism’ given that it hinges 
on the deployment of resources to improve and equalise citizens’ individual abilities to 
compete in the knowledge economy (Streeck, 1999). Greater flexibility and widespread 
low-wage employment is likely to increase relative poverty and overall economic 
insecurity for sizeable groups in the population. An unchecked rise in income inequality 
will worsen citizens’ life chances and opportunities. As a consequence, it is impossible 
to avoid some form of (passive) minimum income support. Temporary inequalities, low 
wages and poor jobs are less problematic than long-term poverty and inactivity traps. 
They become problematic when they negatively affect opportunities for future life 
chances on a structural basis. It is therefore necessary to have an even more tightly 
woven net below the welfare net for the truly needy to meet minimum standards of self-
reliance. 
Institutional recalibration concerns reforms in the design of institutions, levels of 
decision-making, and social and economic policy governance, including the separate 
and joint responsibilities of individuals, states, markets and families. One of the most 
distinctive institutional features of the European welfare state has been its public 
legalistic nature: the responsibility of ensuring social solidarity and cohesion has 
ultimately relied on national (i.e., central) government in terms of policy formation, 
funding, administration and implementation. Various developments have been 
challenging this state-centric edifice of the welfare state in recent years — a challenge 
often summarised in the emergence of new forms of ‘governance’ beyond the 
traditional territorial nation-state. The ongoing redefinition of the role of the state with 
respect to welfare provision is apparent in three ways (Supiot, 2001). The inevitable 
failure to deliver diversified public goods and decentralised services in turn triggers 
popular discontent with the public sector; hence the need for policy change and 
innovation and experimentation with new forms of public and private service provision 
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in childcare, education and training, and professional care for the elderly. As a 
consequence, national governments no longer hierarchically monopolise welfare 
provision. Diversified demand in the face of tight budgets makes it increasingly difficult 
for governments to apply uniform rules and procedures to welfare servicing. 
Customisation of welfare provision to meet individual needs with transfers and services 
goes together with institutional devolution, decentralisation, liberalisation and 
privatisation. Many countries (especially the larger ones) have been experimenting with 
decentralisation of competencies to subnational (regional and local) governments. 
Markets and families have gained greater responsibility and community-based ‘third 
sector’ associations have been called on to deliver new services. From a horizontal 
perspective, there is an increasing recognition that effective social policy formation and 
implementation today requires ‘joined up’ governance across government departments, 
public agencies, private-sector organisations and community associations, together with 
more effective forms of policy coordination across various functionally differentiated 
policy areas of activation, social protection, family services and housing. Last but not 
least, the EU has in recent years emerged as an autonomous supranational body of 
social regulation and to some extent redistribution (through the structural funds), 
creating additional layers of multilevel governance, to which I now turn. 
5 Beyond the ‘double bind’ of social Europe 
The negative outcomes in France and the Netherlands of the 2005 referenda on the 
Constitutional Treaty are indicative of the ‘growing pains’ of the shift from an elite-
driven diplomatic to a broader political EU. The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty 
by French and Dutch voters evidenced discontent about globalisation, unease over 
immigration and resistance to the prospect of Turkey joining the EU in the near future 
— this against the background of a stagnating euro-zone economy (Wallace, 2005). The 
Single Market, EMU and the SGP, which started out as a path-breaking structural policy 
reform of enhanced European economic cooperation, potentially putting long-term 
growth and stability structurally on a higher plane, are increasingly seen as a set of 
constraints that undermine domestic room for manoeuvre. To be sure, the countries that 
stayed out of the first round of EMU — the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark — 
are faring much better. However, the current legitimacy crisis of the EU is not merely a 
problem of economic performance; it is a crisis of political leadership and policy 
engagement. Domestic political elites from Left to Right have been all too happy since 
the adoption of the Single Market to scapegoat the EU for painful reforms. Hereby they 
fed popular discontent against the new Constitution which they themselves eventually 
supported. Now that the public genie is out of the bottle, it is impossible to go back to 
the status quo ex ante of elite-driven technocratic European integration with the 
Commission in the driver’s seat, supported only haphazardly by Member States 
governments. In order to counter the tendencies of Europe’s national political 
economies to become inward-looking, protectionist and xenophobic, nostalgically 
glorifying the past successes of their sovereign national welfare state, EU political 
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leaders are required to develop a policy vision on social progress that European citizens 
can support. Without a social agenda, the EU will not get the support for much-needed 
reforms at the level of the national state over pension and services at the level of the 
EU. The EU affects domestic welfare policy repertoires essentially through four 
avenues of intervention: 
• ‘Community method’ legislation within the framework of the internal market, such as 
health and safety and equal opportunities legislation; 
• Macroeconomic constraints for the euro zone agreed to in the context of EMU and the 
SGP; 
• Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice based on case law, largely derived from 
market compatibility requirements;  
• Agenda-setting policy coordination through the articulation of common challenges, the 
joint diagnosis of new social risks and the identification of potentially effective domestic 
policy solutions to emerging European social problems. 
EU social and economic policy coordination can be broadly characterised along two 
dimensions. First, there is the relevance of cross-border risk-pooling through binding 
legislation against unruly competition through the well-known ‘Community method’. 
Second, in their central role as agenda-setters, EU institutions can help diagnose the 
nature and magnitude of the fundamental challenges and identify potentially effective 
policy solutions to these challenges. Although the relationship between these two 
dimensions of EU policy coordination goes beyond mere overlap and coexistence, in the 
academic debate over the future of ‘social Europe’, these two forms of policy 
coordination are more often than not seen as alternatives rather than complements.  
Leading scholars, most notably Wolfgang Streeck (1995) and Fritz Scharpf (1999), 
have argued that the Single Market and the introduction of EMU, in the wake of 
successive rounds of enlargement, are exemplary for the overall tendency of ‘uneven 
growth’ between the EU’s economic and social policies. The latter, market-correcting 
‘positive integration’ has been unable to keep up with the market-expanding logic of 
‘negative integration’: ‘the removal of tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and other 
barriers to trade or obstacles to free and undistorted competition’ (Scharpf, 1999: 
50−52). On this pessimistic reading, European welfare states face the predicament of a 
‘double bind’. On the one hand, Member States are unlikely to shed their welfare-state 
obligations as this would jeopardise the political base of their legitimacy. On the other 
hand, EU Member States have, since the mid-1980s, become irreversibly committed to 
a pervasive program of European economic integration. In the face of this ‘double 
bind’, national policy-makers cannot want to shed their welfare-state functions without 
jeopardising the territorial bases of their political legitimacy, while at the same time 
they cannot want to reverse the process of economic integration, which increasingly 
exposes their now semi-sovereign welfare states to regulatory competition. The double 
bind presents national and EU-level policy-makers with a thorny dilemma: common 
European solutions are desirable, but neither feasible nor effective on account of 
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national interests, political sensitivities and the huge diversity of social security systems 
in an EU of 25 members (Scharpf, 2002). 
The logic of the ‘double bind’, arguing from a more voluntarist standpoint, can 
however be turned into a ‘double engagement’. This arises out of a corollary to 
Europeanisation. Domestic adjustment problems resulting from economic integration 
can trigger political spillovers that drive consecutive rounds of EU policy initiatives —
pressed for by domestic policy-makers — to deal with the unintended consequences of 
the first round of liberalisation. Such spillovers create the political space for ‘uploading’ 
social policy considerations to the level of the EU. The spectre of competitive welfare 
retrenchment due to the predominance of ‘negative integration’ can thus serve as a 
critical trigger (and hence intellectual resource) for progressive EU and domestic 
policy-makers, encouraging them to engage in ‘positive coordination’ to constructively 
recalibrate national welfare regimes and the European social policy agenda. The 
remarkable resurgence — alluded to earlier — of ‘social pacts’ across the EU in the 
1990s is exemplary of the logic of ‘double engagement’ at the domestic level. 
Following this line of reasoning, Maurizio Ferrera and Elisabetta Gualmini (2000) go so 
far as to claim that EMU in effect saved the Italian welfare state from complete 
ungovernability. At the level of the EU, the introduction of a separate employment 
chapter in the Treaty of Amsterdam provided for a new European political space for 
‘double engagement’. The European Employment Strategy, later dubbed the 
‘Luxembourg process’, was accepted on condition that no national authority would be 
transferred to Brussels, there would be no extra cost, and EMU rules would be fully 
respected. Likewise, in committing the EU to become the ‘most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic 
growth and more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’, the Lisbon summit in 
March 2000 put forward an integrated agenda of economic, employment and social 
objectives, helping EU economies to perform better, while contributing to social 
cohesion and political stability. In terms of institutional innovation, the European 
Council at Lisbon formally recognised the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as a 
new form of European governance, based on common guidelines to be translated into 
national policy, combined with periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review 
organised as learning processes and accompanied by indicators as a means of 
comparing best practices. Since the introduction of the employment strategy in 
Luxembourg, OMC has quickly spread to other social policy areas, such as social 
inclusion (2000), pensions (2001) and health care (since 2004). In terms of substance, 
open coordination processes strongly focus on ‘new’ rather than ‘old’ social risk 
categories, most notably active ageing or avoiding early retirement, part-time work, 
lifelong learning, parental leave, gender mainstreaming, flexicurity (balancing 
flexibility with security), reconciling work and family life, and social exclusion (Zeitlin, 
2005). 
Open coordination, if given more EU political clout and national commitment, can 
play a key role in ongoing processes of welfare recalibration. OMC provides for an 
institutional space for mutual learning and deliberative problem-solving, generating new 
cognitive, normative and practical input for defining an overlapping consensus on EU 
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objectives and ambitions concerning social and economic performance, but not specific 
national programs and institutions. The tie that binds the open method is not so much 
values, policies or institutional structures, but rather a common identity defined in terms 
of problems. OMC is flexible and incremental and recognises national differences, 
which makes it easier to achieve agreement on policy redirection; it allows for change 
and in fact anticipates change by encouraging feedback, policy learning and lesson-
drawing (Maher, 2004). Through OMC persistent heterogeneity may be exploited for 
purposes of experimentation and innovation. By diagnosing common European 
challenges and identifying promising policy approaches through information pooling, 
OMC induces Member States to re-assess, re-evaluate, and re-examine policy 
performance and established policy approaches in comparison with other countries 
under the political pressure ‘to get something done’ on urgent social questions in the 
face of increasing economic interdependencies (Zeitlin, 2005). OMC is extremely 
useful for creating a climate where policy change is possible without triggering social or 
political unrest. In its respect for national political traditions and policy legacies, OMC 
could enhance the legitimacy of the EU as a social union. It serves both substantive EU 
objectives for work and welfare and more ambitious national reform strategies. But the 
real beauty of OMC is that it helps us to focus on reform beyond the formalism of the 
traditional Community method, which so often only serves to obfuscate reform. OMC is 
about a ‘doubly engaging’ policy process par excellence in that it seeks to interlink 
domestic policy-making and EU coordination, combining common action and national 
autonomy beyond the traditional and inflexible Community method and the rather 
formal and defensive deployment of the subsidiarity and proportionality principles in 
EU policy-making. In effect, OMC signals a shift towards a richer and more 
constructive notion of subsidiarity.  
In practice, however, OMC processes are far from perfect. Especially, the method’s 
degree of ‘openness’ in terms of political exposure and commitment, together with the 
lack of substantive focus, should be criticised. OMC practices are particularly poorly 
integrated in domestic policy processes; public awareness, media coverage and 
parliamentary overview remain poorly developed. The role of the European Parliament 
so far has been only considered in strictly advisory terms, while, more seriously, 
national parliaments have let themselves be marginalised in the process. Open 
coordination is dominated by a new class of higher civil servants and EU officials. 
These problems of political accountability have not been compensated (enough) by 
other mechanisms of civil society articulation and representation. To be sure, without 
substantive consensus or common concerns and a sense of urgency for cross-national 
problem-solving, there is the danger that OMC will end up as a ritual of ‘dressing up’ 
existing policy legacies. Taking heed of the Sapir report on economic growth (Sapir et 
al., 2003) and the Kok reports on employment (Kok et al., 2003) and the Lisbon strategy 
(Kok et al., 2004), there is a clear need to refocus the Lisbon agenda, urging national 
governments to act together and go beyond defending the vested interests of their now 
semi-sovereign welfare states. A greater focus on growth, employment and social 
cohesion in a three-year sequence may be sufficient to render processes of open 
coordination less opaque and to facilitate better coordination across policy sectors both 
at EU and national levels. 
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6 The imperative social pragmatism 
Welfare state futures are not preordained. Neither the doomsday scenario of the demise 
of the European welfare state, predicted by economists in the 1980s, nor the prevalent 
image of a ‘frozen welfare status quo’, pictured by comparative scholarship in the 
1990s, can be corroborated by the European welfare reform experience since the late 
1970s. In the 1980s, welfare provisions became more austere. Since the mid-1990s, we 
can observe an incipient process of ‘contingent convergence’ of employment and social 
policy objectives and the adoption of increasingly similar policy initiatives (encouraged 
also by the deepening of the EU social agenda), signalling a transition from a corrective 
and passive welfare state to a more proactive social investment strategy, with much 
greater attention being paid to prevention, activation and social servicing. In hindsight, 
it seems that in their efforts to repair the increasingly dysfunctional policy repertoires of 
the golden age, domestic and EU policy-makers, pressed by intensified economic 
internationalisation and post-industrial differentiation, under conditions of permanent 
austerity have turned to combining elements from different welfare regimes. In their 
different attempts to achieve greater efficiency and equity, we can observe a trend of 
welfare hybridisation, based on domestic policy experimentation and processes of cross-
national social learning. The EU, as an institution that spans national boundaries, herein 
provides a vital additional exploratory space for cross-national agenda-setting, 
benchmarking of policy performances and sharing of domestic policy reform 
experiences. European welfare states are no longer closed systems; they are increasingly 
open, evolutionary systems that are inhabited by agents who learn and constantly apply 
the lessons of domestic experience and EU social and economic policy coordination. 
Over the past decade, EU social policy-makers have reluctantly given up their first-
order preference for the administrative ‘one-size-fits-all” routines of the Community 
method, directed towards binding social and labour standards, and, as a consequence, 
have been rather slow to endorse what are in their view second-best, voluntarist 
processes of open coordination and social dialogue, involving both domestic and EU 
policy-makers in monitoring progress, diffusing best practices, and redefining common 
concerns and shared social and economic objectives. And given that community 
legislation will inevitably become more difficult in a more heterogeneous EU of 25 
Member States, social progress will have to rely more on horizontal EU social dialogue 
and the ‘soft law’ processes of the open method of coordination so as to balance 
common concerns and legitimate diversity. To be sure, the image of ‘doubly engaging’ 
welfare recalibration has been placed in jeopardy by the loss in commitment to the 
Lisbon momentum, and also in the light of the French and Dutch referendum outcomes. 
Processes of open coordination have to become more overtly political by introducing 
robust democratic parameters. In the highly charged political context of today, ‘one-
size-fits-all’ directives from Brussels, for example on weekly working hours, are surely 
not the way forward. The EU should stimulate more daring forays into two-way 
political engagement over an ambitious policy agenda endorsed by the European 
Council and the Member States. Social progress in the EU has to be built on the politics 
of ‘double engagement”.  
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Despite the imperative of ‘double engagement’, social policy reform essentially 
remains a domestic enterprise: reforms have to be endorsed by elected governments and 
national political parties (preferably supported by key organised interests) and 
implemented through domestic administrative structures. By the same token, processes 
of welfare recalibration certainly do not require a search for a ‘blank-slate’ new model, 
a radically novel blueprint to replace the social and economic policy repertoires that 
exist at national level. We live in a world of path-dependent solutions. Reform, even 
radical policy change, does take place, but it is ‘institutionally bounded’ change. Any 
attempt to measure social and economic performance is critically dependent on 
identifying the particular institutional conditions under which it is possible to formulate 
and implement effective and equitable policies. The interaction between economic 
performance and welfare policy is far too complex and dynamic to allow for simple 
remedies and quick fixes. The analysis of social policy as an investment resource thus 
relies heavily on sophisticated understandings of the modus operandi of the welfare 
state, which are more complex than those supported by neoliberal orthodoxy; the latter, 
at best, views social policy as necessary side-payments to groups adversely affected by 
economic restructuring. But in contrast to the possible adverse effects of social policy 
on economic performance, the reasoning behind the idea of social policy as an 
investment occupies a difficult intellectual and political position. Although 
comprehensive welfare states are surely not economically dysfunctional, there are social 
policies that do have a negative impact on economic processes, like excessively 
generous social benefits not backed by activating labour market policies. We always 
need to consider the ‘fine’ structures of the welfare state in conjunction with inside and 
outside policy pressures. This also makes the political nature of policy prescriptions 
eminently conditional. 
Welfare reform is a political process that involves the strategic framing of policy 
problems and solutions by political actors and interests. Reforms are the products of 
lengthy processes of (re-)negotiation between political parties, governments and often 
also the social partners. In order to gain political legitimacy for promising new policy 
formulas, political entrepreneurs wishing to put novel policy alternatives on the political 
agenda are pressed to elaborate new normative priorities (or to redefine old ones) and to 
communicate their (novel) cognitive insights regarding the challenges ahead in a 
publicly compelling manner so as to convert current anxieties over economic 
internationalisation, post-industrial differentiation and conditions of permanent austerity 
into a more mobilising pursuit of policy priorities and political ambitions.  Following 
the logic of Sen’s capability approach, the policy priorities listed above concern policy 
interventions to empower citizens to act as autonomous agents, and, especially, to allow 
for choice between different employment statuses according to shifting preferences and 
circumstances during the life course (Schmid, 2005; Sen, 2001).  
Necessary investments in family services, education and training, subsidised 
employment, labour market integration for immigrants, decent basic pensions and 
adequate minimum income protection do come with a price ticket. However, in the 
medium term, the gains are very likely to outweigh the initial costs of the social 
investment strategy. Moreover, investments in (public and private) social services also 
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provide job opportunities, especially for women, older workers, young people and 
immigrants. And in increasing the volume and improving the quality of the workforce, 
high-return investments support economic growth. This, in turn, generates additional 
government revenue, which ultimately contributes to the long-term sustainability of the 
European welfare state. 
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